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Abstract
In this paper we present a version of the Melitz (2003) model for the case of a small economy
and summarize the key relationships in the model in a simple picture. We then show how this
approach helps to provide a simple and intuitive analysis of the implications of asymmetric changes
in trade barriers. In particular, we show that a decline in the costs of importing and/or exporting
increases welfare of the liberalizing country.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we present a version of the Melitz (2003) model for the case of a small economy.
We show that unlike the case of the Melitz (2003) setup with large economies, the equilibrium
analysis can be carried out with the help of a simple ￿gure that summarizes the key relationships
in the model. In particular, we show that the equilibrium can be fully characterized by two
conditions that relate the wage with the productivity cut-o⁄ for exporters in the small country.
First, there is a ￿competitiveness￿condition, according to which a higher wage reduces the country￿ s
competitiveness, and this leads to an increase in the productivity cut-o⁄ for exporting. Second,
there is a ￿trade balance￿condition, according to which an increase in the productivity cut-o⁄ for
exporting leads to a decline in exports and, hence, a trade de￿cit. The de￿cit must be counteracted
by a decline in the wage, which increases exports and decreases imports. These two conditions give
us two curves, the competitiveness curve and the trade balance curve, one sloping upwards and one
downwards as shown in Figure 1, and their intersection gives the equilibrium.
We illustrate the usefulness of this approach by exploring the implications of asymmetric changes
in trade barriers. With the aid of our simple ￿gure, we show that unilateral trade liberalization
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1Figure 1: The Equilibrium Conditions
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(i.e., a decline in the variable or ￿xed costs of importing) by the small economy does not a⁄ect
the competitiveness curve but it shifts the trade balance curve downwards, since a lower wage
is needed to restore trade balance after imports become cheaper. As we see in Figure 1(a), this
leads to a decline in the wage and a decline in the productivity cut-o⁄ for exporters. The e⁄ect
on the real wage is unambiguous: we show that welfare always moves in the opposite direction as
the productivity cut-o⁄ for exporting, thus, implying that unilateral trade liberalization increases
welfare (i.e., the price index falls by more than the wage).1 Similarly, a decline in the variable cost
of exporting leads to a shift up in the competitiveness curve with no movement in the trade balance
curve, implying from Figure 1(b) an increase in the wage and also a decline in the productivity
cut-o⁄ for exporting. Hence, welfare also increases.
In contrast to several recent contributions (e.g., Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2006), De-
midova (2008), Chor (2009), Baldwin and Okubo (2009), and Baldwin and Forslid (2010) among
the others), we do not assume the existence of an ￿outside￿sector that pins down the wage, so our
analysis takes into account the e⁄ect of trade liberalization on the equilibrium wage. Our model is
similar to Demidova and Rodr￿guez-Clare (2009), but here our focus is di⁄erent: instead of char-
acterizing the optimal policies to deal with the various distortions in the model, here we show that
the model admits a simple and intuitive analysis of the equilibrium determination and comparative
statics.
We start in Section 2 by considering the standard case of two large economies. There we show
that unilateral trade liberalization by one of these economies moves both the competitiveness and
the trade balance curves and so the graphical analysis is insu¢ cient. Changes in the wage and
the productivity cut-o⁄s of the liberalizing economy a⁄ect the intensity of competition in the other
1In the text below we show that the free entry condition implies that the productivity cut-o⁄s for domestic pro-
duction and for exporting move in opposite directions, and also that the productivity cut-o⁄ for domestic production
is a su¢ cient statistic for welfare. A direct implication is that a decline in the productivity cut-o⁄ for exporting leads
to an increase in welfare.
2economy, and this is what leads to the shift in the competitiveness curve. In Section 3 we show
that this is no longer true in the case of a small economy, which we show to be the limit of the
regular model as one of the countries becomes small.
2 Case of a Large Economy
To demonstrate the advantage of our approach, we will ￿rst look at the general Melitz (2003) model
of two large but possibly asymmetric economies. We will show how complicated the analysis of
comparative statics in this setting can be by looking at the case of unilateral trade liberalization.
2.1 Model
Consider two countries indexed by i = 1;2 and populated by Li identical households, each of which
has a unit of labor supplied inelastically. There is a continuum of goods indexed by ! 2 ￿. The
representative consumer has Dixit Stiglitz preferences in each country with elasticity of substitution
￿ > 1.
Each country has an (endogenous) measure Me
i of monopolistically competitive ￿rms that pay
a ￿xed cost wiFi to enter the market and draw their random productivity z from the cumulative
distribution function Gi(z). Given z; a ￿rm from country i faces a cost wi=z of producing one unit
and decides whether to sell in the domestic market and/or export abroad. Firms from i have to
pay a ￿xed ￿marketing￿cost wifij to sell in market j. Iceberg trade costs are ￿ij > 1 so that for a
￿rm in i with productivity z the cost of producing and selling one unit in j is wi￿ij=z. We assume
that ￿ii = 1 for i = 1;2.
2.2 Characterization of the Equilibrium
Since pro￿ts are monotonically increasing in productivity, z, there is a productivity cut-o⁄ z￿
ij such
that, among country i￿￿rms, only those with a productivity of at least z￿
ij decide to sell in market
j. Letting ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ 1=￿, these cut-o⁄s are de￿ned implicitly by2;
wjLjP￿￿1
j
￿
wi￿ij=￿z￿
ij
￿1￿￿ = ￿wifij; (1)
where Pj is the price index in country j given by
P1￿￿
j =
2 X
i=1
Me
i
Z 1
z￿
ij
￿
wi￿ij
￿z
￿1￿￿
dGi(z): (2)
The free entry condition for ￿rms in country i equalizes the expected pro￿ts of entering the
market to the entry costs. Following Melitz (2003), we let Ji (a) ￿
R 1
a
h￿z
a
￿￿￿1 ￿ 1
i
dGi (z) and
2In establishing these conditions for the cut-o⁄s, we have used four standard results. First, ￿rms set prices equal
to unit cost multiplied by the mark-up 1=￿. Second, ￿rms￿variable pro￿ts are revenues divided by ￿. Third, revenues
in market j given a price p are RjP
￿￿1
j p
1￿￿, where Rj are total expenditures in j. And fourth, Rj = wjLj since due
to free entry the only source of national income is labor payments.
3note that (from the de￿nition of the cut-o⁄s z￿
ij) the expected pro￿ts for country i￿￿rms in country
j are wifijJi(z￿
ij). Then the free entry condition in country i is
2 X
j=1
fijJi
￿
z￿
ij
￿
= Fi: (3)
Next, let us look at the labor market clearing condition that equalizes total labor demand given
by Me
i Fi +
P2
j=1 Lij to labor supply in country i: Using (3), it can be written as
Me
i ￿
2 X
j=1
fij
￿
Ji
￿
z￿
ij
￿
+ 1 ￿ Gi
￿
z￿
ij
￿￿
= Li: (4)
Total sales by ￿rms from i in j are
Xij = Me
i ￿wifij
Z 1
z￿
ij
￿
z=z￿
ij
￿￿￿1 dGi(z) = Me
i ￿wifij
￿
Ji(z￿
ij) + 1 ￿ Gi(z￿
ij)
￿
:
Trade balance implies that for i 6= j we have Xij = Xji: Hence,
Me
i wifij
￿
Ji(z￿
ij) + 1 ￿ Gi(z￿
ij)
￿
= Me
j wjfji
￿
Jj(z￿
ji) + 1 ￿ Gj(z￿
ji)
￿
: (5)
To summarize, there are 10 unknown equilibrium variables: Me
i , z￿
ii; z￿
ij, Pi, and wi for i;j = 1;2.
We have 9 equilibrium conditions: two free entry conditions, four cut-o⁄conditions, two price index
equations, and trade balance. Setting labor in one of the countries as numeraire, we can then use
the equilibrium conditions to solve for all the unknown variables.3
For future reference, we note here that, as in Melitz (2003), welfare in country i rises with the
productivity cut-o⁄ for domestic sellers, z￿
ii. Free entry implies that there are no pro￿ts, so the real
wage, wi=Pi, measures welfare in our simple economy. Note that (1) directly implies that
wi
Pi
=
￿
Li
￿fii
￿ 1
￿￿1
￿z￿
ii:
As a result, to know what happens to welfare as a result of trade liberalization, we just need to see
what happens to the domestic productivity cut-o⁄, z￿
ii.
2.3 Graphical Analysis
First, let us normalize wage in country 2 to unity, w2 ￿ 1: Then we can reduce the system of 9
equilibrium conditions with 9 unknowns to 2 equations with 2 unknowns, namely, w1 and z￿
12: To
see this, note that from (1) we get
z￿
12 = h12(w1;z￿
22) ￿ ￿12
￿
f12
f22
￿ 1
￿￿1
(w1)
1
￿ z￿
22; (6)
3As is standard in the literature, we assume that iceberg trade and ￿xed marketing costs are such that z
￿
ii < z
￿
ij
for all i;j = 1;2.
4z￿
21 = h21(w1;z￿
11) ￿ ￿21
￿
f21
f11
￿ 1
￿￿1
(w1)
￿ 1
￿ z￿
11: (7)
Furthermore, (3) implies that z￿
22 can be expressed as a function of z￿
21; and z￿
11 can be expressed
as a function of z￿
12. With a slight abuse of notation, we write these two functions as z￿
22(z￿
21) and
z￿
11(z￿
12). Using these functions together with (6) leads to an expression that relates the productivity
cut-o⁄ for exporting from 1 to 2, z￿
12, to the wage in country 1, w1,
z￿
12 = ￿12
￿
f12
f22
￿ 1
￿￿1
(w1)
1
￿ z￿
22 (h21 (w1;z￿
11 (z￿
12))): (EXP)
Similarly, from (4) we can express Me
i as a function of z￿
12 and w1, Me
i (w1;z￿
12), and then
re-write the trade-balance condition as an equation in w1 and z￿
12,
Me
1(w1;z￿
12)f12 [J1 (z￿
12) + 1 ￿ G1(z￿
12)] (TB)
= Me
2(w1;z￿
12)f21 [J2(h21(w1;z￿
11(z￿
12))) + 1 ￿ G2(h21(w1;z￿
11(z￿
12)))]:
This is also an equation in w1 and z￿
12, which together with Condition EXP gives us a system
of 2 equations in 2 unknowns. We can prove the following result:
Lemma 1 Condition EXP implies a positive relationship between w1 and z￿
12; while
Condition TB implies a negative relationship between w1 and z￿
12.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Conditions EXP and TB give us two curves, the ￿competitiveness curve￿and the ￿trade balance
curve,￿one sloping upwards and one downwards as shown in Figure 1, and their intersection gives
the equilibrium values of w1 and z￿
12.
2.4 Unilateral Trade Liberalization
We now can use the model to explore the e⁄ect of unilateral trade liberalization in country 1. In
particular, we consider a reduction of inward variable and/or ￿xed trade barriers in country 1, ￿21
and/or f21. In this case, both conditions EXP and TB are a⁄ected the same way: for any ￿xed
exporting productivity cut-o⁄, wage must fall with a decline in barriers (see the Appendix for the
proof). Therefore, both the competitiveness and trade balance curves move down. Unfortunately,
in this case our graphical analysis does not provide us with the complete description of the new
equilibrium: it is unclear what happens with the equilibrium cut-o⁄ z￿
12 as it can potentially go
up or down. Thus, one needs to go through the complicated mathematical derivations to get the
answer. Nevertheless, knowing from our graphical analysis that w1 falls with falling importing
trade barriers signi￿cantly helps with the derivations, so we can prove that:
Proposition 1 Welfare increases for a country that unilaterally reduces importing trade barriers.
5Proof. See the Appendix.
It is interesting to compare this result to that in Demidova (2008) for the setting with CES
preferences and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) for the setting with linear demand, where lowering
trade barriers for foreign ￿rms reduces welfare at Home. The reason for this result is that such
liberalization in country 1 makes country 2 a better export base, which results in the additional
entry of ￿rms there. This entry intensi￿es competition, which results in less entry and lower welfare
in country 1. Our model shows that this result no longer holds when there is no outside good pinning
down the wage in both countries.
In the next Section we will show how the assumption that country 1 is a small economy used
in Demidova and Rodr￿guez-Clare (2009) helps to signi￿cantly simplify the analysis.
3 Case of a Small Economy
Here we assume that country 1, which we now call ￿Home,￿can be treated as a small economy.
Compared to Section 2, the small economy assumption requires two changes. First, we assume that
foreign demand for a domestic variety is given by Ap￿￿: The term A includes both the national
income and the price index in country 2, which we now call ￿Foreign.￿In line with the small economy
assumption, A is not a⁄ected by changes at Home, i.e., A is exogenous in our small-country setting.
Second, the measure Me
2 of monopolistically competitive ￿rms in Foreign is exogenous. However,
since f21 > 0, not all foreign ￿rms sell at Home, so the measure of foreign varieties available at
Home is endogenous.
In the Appendix we show that our small economy model can be obtained from the model of
two large countries as a limit case, where the share of labor in Home, n, goes to zero. Formally,
we show that if the two large countries are symmetric in everything except for size, and if the
productivity distribution in both countries is Pareto, then in the limit as n ! 0 we obtain the three
key assumptions of the small economy model, namely, that: (1) the domestic productivity cut-o⁄
for ￿rms in Foreign is not a⁄ected by changes at Home; (2) the mass of ￿rms in Foreign is not
a⁄ected by changes at Home, and thus, the mass of available foreign varieties is ￿xed; and (3) the
demand in Foreign for Home goods exported at the price p can be expressed as Ap￿￿; where A is
a constant not a⁄ected by changes at Home.
3.1 Characterization of the Equilibrium
As before, productivity cut-o⁄s z￿
11 and z￿
21 are determined by (1), but z￿
22 is now taken as exogenous,
while z￿
12 is determined by
A(w1￿12=￿z￿
12)
1￿￿ = ￿w1f12: (8)
In turn, the free entry, labor market clearing, and trade balance conditions at Home remain the
same. To summarize, in the case of a small economy, there are 5 unknown variables in the equilib-
rium, Me
1, z￿
11, z￿
12, z￿
21, and w1, de￿ned implicitly by 5 equilibrium equations.
63.2 Graphical Analysis
Next we will show how to reduce the system of 5 equilibrium conditions with 5 unknowns to 2
equations with 2 unknowns, w1 and z￿
12: The ￿rst equation is obtained from (8),
z￿
12 = ￿12f
1=(￿￿1)
12 w
1=￿
1 (￿=A)
1=(￿￿1) =￿: (EXP)
Note that this no longer depends on ￿21 or f21. The reason is that these conditions no longer a⁄ect
country 2 (Foreign) if country 1 (Home) is small. This will simplify the comparative statics below.
The second equation is the trade balance condition and is the same as in the case of two large
economies except that now Me
2 is now exogenous,
Me
1(w1;z￿
12)f12 [J1(z￿
12) + 1 ￿ G1(z￿
12)] (TB)
= Me
2f21 [J2(h21(w1;z￿
11(z￿
12))) + 1 ￿ G2(h21(w1;z￿
11(z￿
12)))]:
Conditions EXP and TB form a system of 2 equations in w1 and z￿
12. Again, it can be shown
that Condition EXP implies a positive relationship between w1 and z￿
12; while Condition TB implies
a negative relationship between w1 and z￿
12: And with the same intuition as before, Conditions EXP
and TB give us two curves, the ￿competitiveness curve￿and the ￿trade balance curve,￿similar to
those shown in Figure 1.
3.3 Unilateral Trade Liberalization
Now, consider a reduction of per-unit and/or ￿xed trade barriers for foreign exporters, ￿21 and/or
f21. Unlike the case with a large Home economy, now only Condition TB is a⁄ected: for any ￿xed
exporting productivity cut-o⁄, the wage must fall with a decline in importing trade barriers at
Home. Therefore, as shown in Figure 1(a), only the trade balance curve moves down, implying an
unambiguous decline in the equilibrium levels of w1 and z￿
12. As before, the decline in z￿
12 implies
an increase in z￿
11 and, hence, an increase in the real wage in Home. The reason that the graphical
analysis is now su¢ cient to establish the result is that the EXP curve does not depend on ￿21 or
f21. In turn, this is because if Home is small then there is no feedback from changes in Home to
the demand for Home goods in Foreign.
We can also use this analysis to explore the impact of reduction in the variable trade costs
that Home faces to export goods to Foreign, i.e., a decline in ￿12. This leads to a shift up in the
competitiveness curve shown in Figure 1(b), as a higher wage in Home is required to leave the
export cut-o⁄ z￿
12 unchanged when ￿12 falls. But there is no shift in the trade balance curve, and
hence, we immediately see that the decline in ￿12 leads to an increase in Home￿ s wage and a decline
in the export cut-o⁄ z￿
12. The latter implies an increase in z￿
11 and, hence, an increase in Home￿ s
real wage.
A decline in the ￿xed cost of exporting by Home ￿rms in Foreign, f12; is unfortunately not as
simple. The reason is that now both the competitiveness and the trade balance curves shift with
changes in f12; where not only f12 enters the equations for both curves directly, but also a⁄ects the
7relationship between z￿
11 and z￿
12 implied by (3), i.e., the function z￿
11 (z￿
12) in Condition TB also
depends on f12; complicating the analysis.
4 Conclusion
The complexity of the Melitz model has led several researchers to adopt short-cuts in the analysis
of trade liberalization in the presence of monopolistic competition, heterogenous ￿rms, and ￿xed
trade costs. Some have assumed that trade liberalization was symmetric in spite of the fact that
liberalization was really asymmetric, often even unilateral. Some have instead added an outside
good sector with zero trade costs as a way to ￿x relative wages, thereby ignoring general equilibrium
forces that are important for the welfare analysis. In this paper we proposed an alternative approach
that has a long history in the international trade literature, namely, that the country of interest is
a small economy. This may miss important feedback e⁄ects when liberalization takes place in large
economies, but for many cases of interest it seems like a reasonable approximation to reality. And
the analytical bene￿ts are signi￿cant ￿for example, the analysis of unilateral trade liberalization
can be done with the help of a simple ￿gure that helps to understand the key forces at play.
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5.1 Proof of Lemma 1
First, let us look at EXP: z￿
12 ￿ ￿12
￿
f12
f22
￿ 1
￿￿1 (w1)
1
￿ z￿
22 = 0: We need to show that
dw1
dz￿
12
= ￿
@LHS=@z￿
12
@LHS=@w1
> 0;
where @LHS=@z￿
12 = 1 ￿ ￿12
￿
f12
f22
￿ 1
￿￿1 (w1)
1
￿ dz￿
22
dz￿
21
dz￿
21
dz￿
11
dz￿
11
dz￿
12: By using (3) to derive dz￿
ii=dz￿
ij; and (7)
to derive dz￿
21=dz￿
11; we get
@LHS=@z￿
12 = 1 ￿
 
f12f21
f11f22
￿12￿21
￿
f12f21
f11f22
￿ 1
￿￿1
!2
J0
1 (z￿
12)J0
2 (z￿
21)
J0
1 (z￿
11)J0
2 (z￿
22)
;
where J0
i (a) = 1￿￿
a
R 1
a
￿’
a
￿￿￿1 dGi (’): Using EXP and (7); we get
@LHS=@z￿
12 = 1 ￿ (￿12￿21)
2(1￿￿)
R 1
z￿
12 ’￿￿1dG1 (’)
R 1
z￿
21 ’￿￿1dG2 (’)
R 1
z￿
11 ’￿￿1dG1 (’)
R 1
z￿
22 ’￿￿1dG2 (’)
> 0;
since ￿12￿21 > 1; z￿
11 < z￿
12; and z￿
22 < z￿
21: Next, note that
@LHS=@w1 = ￿
z￿
12
￿w1
￿ ￿12
￿
f12
f22
￿ 1
￿￿1
(w1)
1
￿ dz￿
22
dz￿
21
dz￿
21
dw1
< 0;
since from (3) and (7); dz￿
22=dz￿
21 < 0 and dz￿
21=dw1 = ￿z￿
21=￿w1: Hence, from EXP, dw1=dz￿
12 > 0:
Finally, let us look at TB. Denote
￿
fii
R 1
z￿
ii (’=z￿
ii)
￿￿1 dGi (’)
￿
=
￿
fij
R 1
z￿
ij
￿
’=z￿
ij
￿￿￿1
dGi (’)
￿
by  i: Given w1 from (7), and using (4), TB can be rewritten as
L2
￿
f22 [J2 (z￿
22) + 1 ￿ G2 (z￿
22)]
f21 [J2 (z￿
21) + 1 ￿ G2 (z￿
21)]
+ 1
￿￿1
=
w1L1
￿
￿
f11 [J1 (z￿
11) + 1 ￿ G1 (z￿
11)]
f12 [J1 (z￿
12) + 1 ￿ G1 (z￿
12)]
+ 1
￿￿1
;
or ￿
￿21 (f21=f11)
1
￿￿1
￿￿
(z￿
21)
￿￿ ( 2 + 1) = (z￿
11)
￿￿ ( 1 + 1): (9)
The RHS of (9) can be written as a function of z￿
12: From (3), it rises with z￿
12: The LHS of (9)
can be written as a function of z￿
21: Again from (3); the LHS of (9) rises with z￿
21: Thus, from TB
it follows that if z￿
12 rises, then z￿
21 must rise as well. Moreover, from (3), z￿
11 must fall with rising
z￿
12: Using these conclusions together in (7); we proved that from TB, w1 falls with z￿
12:
5.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Shift in the curves. First, let us show that for any given z￿
12, a decrease in ￿21 and/or f21 shifts
down the competitiveness curve. To see this, note that if z￿
12 is ￿xed, then from (3), z￿
11 is ￿xed as
well. But since from EXP and (7); z￿
12z￿
21 = ￿12￿21 (f12f21=f11f22)
1
￿￿1 z￿
11z￿
22; z￿
22 must rise and z￿
21
9must fall (from (3) they move in the opposite directions). Hence, from EXP, w1 falls for any ￿xed
z￿
12:
Now we need to show that for any ￿xed w1; a decrease in ￿21 and/or f21 shifts the trade balance
curve to the left, i.e., z￿
12 falls for any given w1. First, note that as ￿21 (and/or f21) falls, then z￿
21
must fall as well. To see this, for a ￿xed w1; we can rewrite (7) and (9) as
￿21
￿
f21
f11
￿ 1
￿￿1 z￿
11
z￿
21
= (w1)
1
￿ ￿ Const1; (10)
( 1 + 1) = w1 ( 2 + 1) ￿ Const2 ￿ ( 2 + 1): (11)
Assume that z￿
21 rises. Then from (10), z￿
11 must rise as well. However, if z￿
21 rises, then from
(3), z￿
22 falls, resulting in falling  2 and (from (11)) falling  1; which from (3) implies that z￿
11 falls,
leading to contradiction. Hence, z￿
21 falls with a fall in ￿21 (and/or f21):
Next, in the case of falling ￿21; a fall in z￿
21 raises z￿
22 and decreases  2, so that  1 falls as well,
implying a fall in z￿
12; which we wanted to prove. However, in the case of falling f21 we cannot use
the same logic, since f21 enters the free entry condition (3) for country 2. Let us assume that z￿
12
rises. Then from (3), z￿
11 falls and, in turn,  1 rises so that from (11),  2 must rise as well. But
 2 =
f22
R 1
z￿
22 (’=z￿
22)
￿￿1 dG2 (’)
￿
(f21)
1
￿￿1 =z￿
21
￿￿￿1 R 1
z￿
21 ’￿￿1dG2 (’)
; (12)
where, as we proved before, z￿
21 falls, and from (10), (f21)
1
￿￿1 =z￿
21 must rise with falling z￿
11 and
￿21: Hence, the denominator in (12) rises, so for  2 to rise, z￿
22 must fall. Then from (3), f21J2 (z￿
21)
should fall as well. However, since z￿
21 falls with falling f21;
f21J2 (z￿
21) =
￿
(f21)
1
￿￿1 =z￿
21
￿￿￿1
"Z 1
z￿
21
’￿￿1dG2 (’) ￿ (z￿
21)
￿￿1 (1 ￿ G(z￿
21))
#
must rise, not fall, which leads to contradiction. Thus, we proved that for any given w1; z￿
12 falls
with a fall in f21:
Welfare change. We know from Figure 1 that if both curves shift down, w1 falls with a fall
in ￿21 and/or f21: Can z￿
12 rise as a result? Assume that yes. Then from (3), z￿
11 falls. This means
that in (9) rewritten as w1 ( 2 + 1) = ( 1 + 1);  1 rises. Hence, the LHS of (9) must rise as well.
Then in the case of a fall in ￿21 this means that from (3), z￿
21 must rise and z￿
22 must fall. But,
from (6) z￿
22 must rise, which results in contradiction. Thus, in the case of falling ￿21 z￿
12 falls. The
case of falling f21 is more complicated since f21 is a part of  2: To deal with it, let us rewrite  2 as
 2 =
f22 (z￿
22)
1￿￿ R 1
z￿
22 ’￿￿1dG2 (’)
f21 (z￿
21)
￿￿1 R 1
z￿
21 ’￿￿1dG2 (’)
=
(￿12￿21)
￿￿1 f12 (z￿
12)
1￿￿ R 1
z￿
22 ’￿￿1dG2 (’)
f11 (z￿
11)
1￿￿ R 1
z￿
21 ’￿￿1dG2 (’)
;
where the last equality follows from (6) and (7). Then since w1 and z￿
11 fall, while z￿
22 and z￿
12 rise,
for the LHS of (9) to rise, z￿
21 must rise. However, if f21 falls, while z￿
22 and z￿
21 rise, then the LHS
of (3) for the Foreign country falls, while the RHS remains constant, which leads to contradiction.
Hence, as in the case of falling ￿21; z￿
12 falls with a fall in f21: Therefore, from (3), z￿
11 rises, raising
welfare at Home.
105.3 Justi￿cation of Small Economy Assumptions
Here we will show that the assumptions we use to treat Home as a small economy can be obtained
from the model of two large countries, Home and Foreign, with Home becoming small relative to
the Foreign one (the ￿limit￿case). In particular, if two countries are endowed with n and (1 ￿ n)
shares of the world￿ s labor, L;
L1 = nL; L2 = (1 ￿ n)L; n 2 [0;1];
then the ￿limit￿case we want to explore is the one when n ! 0: The assumptions we want to explain
by the ￿limit￿case are: (1) The domestic productivity cuto⁄ for foreign ￿rms (and, therefore, the
productivity distribution of the active ￿rms there) is not a⁄ected by changes at Home; (2) The
mass of ￿rms in the Foreign country is not a⁄ected by changes at Home, and thus, the mass of
available foreign varieties is ￿xed; and (3) The foreign demand for Home goods exported at the
price p can be expressed as Ap￿￿; where A is a constant not a⁄ected by changes at Home.
To simplify our analysis, we assume that 2 countries are symmetric in everything except for
their sizes, i.e., f11 = f22 = f; f12 = f21 = fx; F1 = F2 = Fe; ￿12 = ￿21 = ￿: Also, we assume that
the productivity distribution in both countries is now speci￿ed as Pareto: G(￿) = 1 ￿
￿
b
￿
￿￿
for
￿ ￿ b: Then, the free entry condition in country i can be written as
(￿ ￿ 1)b￿
h
f (z￿
ii)
￿￿ + fx
￿
z￿
ij
￿￿￿i
= Fe; (FE)
where ￿ = ￿=(￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)): Moreover, from (6) and (7),
z￿
ij = ￿
￿
fx
f
￿ 1
￿￿1 ￿
wi
wj
￿ ￿
￿￿1
z￿
jj ￿ B
￿
wi
wj
￿ ￿
￿￿1
z￿
jj; where B ￿ ￿
￿
fx
f
￿ 1
￿￿1
> 1:
Note that by using FE in the de￿nition of Me
i , we get
Me
i =
(￿ ￿ 1)b￿
￿Fe
Li:
Hence, if we denote w1
w2 by w; then we get the new TB condition:
n
1 ￿ n
= w
2￿ ￿
￿￿1￿1
￿
z￿
11
z￿
22
￿￿￿
: (TB)
To summarize, for given n; the equilibrium in the model with 2 countries can be described by 2
free entry and 1 trade balance conditions and 3 unknown variables, z￿
11; z￿
22; and w.
What happens in the model described above when n ! 0? Solving FE for z￿
11 and z￿
22 gives
￿
z￿
11
z￿
22
￿￿￿
=
1 ￿
fx
f B￿￿w
￿￿ ￿
￿￿1
1 ￿
fx
f B￿￿w
￿ ￿
￿￿1
;
so that the TB condition can be rewritten as
n
1 ￿ n
= w
2￿ ￿
￿￿1￿11 ￿
fx
f B￿￿w
￿￿ ￿
￿￿1
1 ￿
fx
f B￿￿w
￿ ￿
￿￿1
: (13)
11As n ! 0; the LHS of (13) goes to 0. Moreover, the RHS of (13) rises with w (here we use
the fact that
fx
f B￿￿ < 1): Hence, as n falls, w falls as well, and when n ! 0; the RHS of (13)
goes to 0: Note that if n < 1=2; then w < 1: (If w > 1; then from FE; z￿
11 < z￿
22: But then
in (13), the LHS<1, while the RHS>1, resulting in contradiction.). Thus, the denominator in
the RHS of (13) is always positive and bigger than 1 ￿
fx
f B￿￿. Hence, as n ! 0; we must have
w
2￿ ￿
￿￿1￿1
￿
1 ￿
fx
f B￿￿w
￿￿ ￿
￿￿1
￿
! 0: Can w be below
h
fx
f B￿￿
i ￿￿1
￿￿ for some n 2 (0;1=2)? The
answer is no, since in this case the RHS of (13) would become negative, while n=(1 ￿ n) > 0: Thus,
as n ! 0; then w falls to
h
fx
f B￿￿
i ￿￿1
￿￿ : Moreover, from FE, if n falls, then z￿
22 falls and z￿
11 rises.
Note that due to the Pareto distribution assumption, z￿
22 cannot fall below b; the minimum
value for ￿; but from the solution of FE, it seems that z￿
22 ! 0 as n ! 0: How to explain this? The
reason is that as n continues to fall, z￿
22 reaches its minimum so that all foreign ￿rms survive. As
n continues to fall; z￿
22 remains at level b; and the zero pro￿t condition for country 2 is violated,
so that FE is no longer true for country 2.4 This also means that we proved assumption (1):
productivity cuto⁄ z￿
22 is not a⁄ected by changes at Home, when n is small enough.
Now let us derive the new FE conditions for n small enough so that z￿
22 = b and ￿22 (z￿
22) > 0.
While for Home we have the same FE condition as before, for the Foreign country,
1
￿
L2P￿￿1
2 ￿￿￿1￿b￿￿1 ￿ f + fx (￿ ￿ 1)b￿ (z￿
21)
￿￿ = Fe;
which from the zero pro￿t condition for exporters from Home can be rewritten as
wfx
￿
w￿
z￿
12
￿￿￿1
￿b￿￿1 ￿ f + fx (￿ ￿ 1)b￿ (z￿
21)
￿￿ = Fe: (FE)
By using the new FE conditions for small enough n; we get
Me
1 =
(￿ ￿ 1)b￿nL
￿Fe
; Me
2 =
(1 ￿ n)L
￿
￿
Fe + f + b￿fx (z￿
21)
￿￿
￿;
which allows us to rewrite the TB condition as
n
1 ￿ n
=
Fe (z￿
12=z￿
21)
￿
(￿ ￿ 1)b￿w
￿
Fe + f + b￿fx (z￿
21)
￿￿
￿:
As n ! 0; the LHS falls to 0 as well. Since the minimum value for Fe +f +b￿fx (z￿
21)
￿￿ cannot
be smaller than Fe + f; (z￿
12=z￿
21)
￿ =w ! 0 as n ! 0: Using this property in the new FE condition
for country 2; which we can rewrite as
fx
￿
w￿
z￿
12
￿￿￿1
￿b￿￿1 (z￿
12)
￿ + fx (￿ ￿ 1)b￿
h
(z￿
12=z￿
21)
￿ =w
i
= (Fe + f)
(z￿
12)
￿
w
;
means that we can ignore the second term in the LHS above, i.e., for small enough n;
fx
￿
w￿
z￿
12
￿￿￿1
￿b￿￿1 (z￿
12)
￿ ￿ (Fe + f)
(z￿
12)
￿
w
; or w￿ (z￿
12)
1￿￿ ￿ const:
4Note that this logic also applies to the other types of the productivity distributions.
12However, from the zero pro￿t condition for exporters from Home, R2P￿￿1
2 / w￿ (z￿
12)
1￿￿ : Hence,
we proved assumption (3): at some low level of n; we can treat R2P￿￿1
2 as a constant, i.e., the
foreign demand for Home goods exported at the price p can be expressed as Ap￿￿. This also means
that since for small n; P1￿￿
2 = Me
2￿￿￿￿1b￿ + Me
1￿b￿ (￿=￿w)
￿￿1 (z￿
12)
￿￿+(￿￿1) ￿ Me
2￿￿￿￿1b￿ (as L1
is very small) and R2 ￿ L; then treating R2P￿￿1
2 as a constant implies treating Me
2 as a constant,
i.e., we proved assumption (2).
13